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Abstract
We extend the literature on exclusive dealing, which assumes that entry can occur only by
installing new capacity, by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This
uncovers new eﬀects. First, exclusive deals can be used to improve the incumbent’s bargaining
position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent ﬁn d si te a s i e rt oe l i c i tt h eb u y e r ’ s
acceptance. Third, exclusive dealing, despite allowing the more eﬃcient technology to ﬁnd its
way into the industry, reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas
independent entry would be socially optimal, (ii) it leads to a sub-optimal contractual price
when the exclusive dealing include a price commitment, (iii) it may deter entry altogether.
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11 Introduction
Exclusive dealing provisions are contracts between a buyer and a seller that prohibit the buyer from
trading with other (typically rival) sellers. The possible anti-competitive eﬀect of such contracts,
which has been at the centre of several prominent antitrust cases both in the US and in Europe,1 is
one of the most controversial issues in antitrust.
In the U.S., the courts treated exclusive dealing harshly for many years. The justiﬁcation for this
treatment was that if a buyer signs an exclusive contract, all other sellers are foreclosed from compet-
ing for that buyer’s business. Hence, exclusive contracts can easily lead to exclusion of competitors
and to monopolization. Beginning in the 1950s, this view was attacked by the so-called "Chicago-
school" scholars on the grounds that excluding rivals by means of exclusive contracts is not proﬁtable
for the seller.2 This view has been very inﬂuential and led U.S. courts to adopt an opposite benev-
olent stance towards exclusive dealing. However, beginning in the mid-1980s a number of authors
have showed that the courts’ traditional concern was not ill-founded and have formally established
that, under speciﬁc circumstances, an incumbent ﬁrm can proﬁtably use exclusive contracts to deter
entry of a more eﬃcient rival. See, for instance, Aghion and Bolton (1987), Spier and Whinston
(1995), Rasmusen et al. (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000), Bernheim and Whinston (1998), and
Fumagalli and Motta (2006).3 This triggered the U.S. courts to take the anti-competitive eﬀects of
exclusive dealing more seriously in several recent cases (such as the ones mentioned in footnote 1
above).4
A common feature of this recent literature is the assumption that the new ﬁrm can enter the
market only by establishing an independent plant. Then, when the presence of the exclusive dealing
forecloses access to the buyers, thereby making independent entry unproﬁtable, the more eﬃcient
ﬁrm is forced to stay out of the market. However, it is natural to think that a more advanced
technology can ﬁnd other channels to ﬁnd its way into the market. A merger with the incumbent,
or a licensing agreement with it, are examples of such channels.5
1Among early important decisions involving exclusive dealing arrangements, see Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co. [258 U.S. 346 (1922)], Standard Oil Co. of California v. U.S. [337 US 293 (1949)], and U.S. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corporation [347 U.S. 521 (1954)]. Among recent cases, see Schöller v. Commission, European Court
Case T-9/95, U.S. v. Microsoft (1995 Consent Decree), U.S. v. Dentsply [399 F.3d 181 (2001)], Conwood v. United
States Tobacco [290 F.3d 768 (2002)] and U.S. v. Visa USA [344 F.3d 229 (2003)].
2See Director and Levi (1956), Posner (1976) and Bork (19789. For a more formal explanation of their argument
see below. See also Motta (2004: 363-4) for a textbook presentation.
3Aghion and Bolton (1987) is distinct from the other papers because entry is deterred by the incumbent only "by
mistake". The incumbent uses the exclusive contract, which includes a price commitment and a penalty to be paid
in case the buyer switches to the entrant, to extract rents from the entrant. If the incumbent knew the costs of the
entrant with certainty, it would always prefer to set the contract terms so as to allow the entrant into the industry and
collect the rents created by its more eﬃcient technology through the penalty. Under uncertainty, a penalty which is
optimal ex-ante might turn out to be too high for an entrant and entry might therefore be involuntarily deterred. Spier
and Whinston (1995) show that, in the presence of noncontractible relationship-speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t s ,t h ei n e ﬃcient use
of stipulated damages identiﬁed by Aghion and Bolton emerges despite the buyer’s and seller’s ability to renegotiate
the initial contract.
4Hence U.S. courts now try to assess case by case whether the anti-competitive harm exists and whether it dominates
the potential eﬃciency-enhancing beneﬁts. Instead in the EU, the use of exclusive dealing by a dominant ﬁrm is, by
and large, prohibited per se. However, this formalistic approach is now under revision and many antitrust experts
suggest to move to an "eﬀects-based" approach also in Europe. Recent policy discussions of exclusive contracts include
Whinston (2001), Jacobson (2002) and Farrell (2005).
5Another mechanism would be to allow for the exclusive dealing to be renegotiated. Like most of the literature on
2The beer industry provides some insightful anecdotal evidence on the relation between exclusive
dealing and mergers. Establishing exclusive dealing arrangements with independent distributors
is a strategy commonly adopted by incumbent ﬁrms to create strong distribution networks, which
represent a relevant competitive advantage against rivals. In order to overcome such a barrier, new
entrants have sometimes resorted to mergers and acquisitions. For instance, in 2003 Interbrew, a
big Belgian brewer, acquired 70% of K.K. Brewery, the leading beer maker in Zhejiang Province, in
China. Other Western brewers (such as Anheuser-Busch and SAB-Miller) were also using acquisitions
to get into the second largest market in the world. For foreigners this push was a second attempt.
During the 1990s several of them failed to break into the market: they tried to do it alone but they
could not compete successfully without the access to local distribution networks.6
Another example is the development in the US beer industry in the 1990s, as described by
Tremblay and Tremblay (2005), where strong incumbents strengthened their exclusivity deals with
distributors in reaction to the growth of micro breweries in order to induce exit and takeovers:
"...in the 1990s Anheuser-Busch and Miller started ﬁnancial incentive programmes that encouraged
distributors to exclusively carry their own regular and speciality brands in eﬀort to squeeze out rival
craft and contract products (...)”. This induced some successful micro brewers to sell part of their
shares to the incumbents.7 Indeed, according to Kurt Widmer, the founder of the Widmer brewery,
"... selling a 31% share of his company to Anheuser-Busch, by providing access to their best-in-the-
industry distribution system, was the only way to avoid killing the company and have the chance to
expand (...)."8
More generally, that incumbents’ relation to customers aﬀects the entry mode in new markets is
supported by the literature on foreign direct investments which documents that multinational ﬁrms
tend to enter into foreign markets via M&As rather than greenﬁeld investments in order to have
access to strategic assets such as local distribution networks.9
Allowing the entrant to merge with the incumbent, thereby providing an alternative channel for
eﬃcient entry to take place, raises the question of whether exclusive dealing can still be used by an
incumbent ﬁrm for anti-competitive purposes. In this paper we address this question, which - to the
best of our knowledge - has not been studied yet.10
We construct a model where the entrant might enter the industry either via independent produc-
tion or through a merger: in the latter case, the merged entity will employ the entrant’s more eﬃcient
technology in the incumbent’s existing plant. Note that the merger could also be interpreted as a
exclusive dealing, we rule out renegotiation (see more below for discussion).
6See The Economist," B e e ri nC h i n a :M a s k so ﬀ, down the hatch", May 15th 2003.
7In terms of our discussion, micro brewers could be likened to an eﬃcient entrant with superior technology (product)
but no access to buyers because of exclusive contracts which link the latter with the incumbents.
8See Bizjournals "Beer brothers eye bigtime: Widmer Brothers Brewing hopes to take its brand national", 8th
November 1999.
9See World Investment Report (2000) and its reference to diﬀerent studies of cross-border M&As.
10To our knowledge, the only paper that studies the interaction between mergers and exclusive contracts is Chen
and Riordan (2006). However, they focus on vertical mergers and address a diﬀerent issue. In particular, they
consider two buyers that compete (vigorously) in a downstream market, and show that an upstream supplier which is
vertically integrated with one of them is able to induce the other buyer to accept exclusivity, thereby foreclosing an
equally eﬃcient upstream rival and monopolizing the downstream market. Under vertical separation, instead, gaining
compliance on exclusivity by both downstream ﬁrms would be too costly.
3licensing agreement or a transfer of technology: the incumbent buys the eﬃcient technology from
the entrant, which will not operate independently in the market. (Throughout the paper, we shall
mostly use the term “mergers”, but it should be clear that we could indiﬀerently talk of licensing
agreements.) We also introduce an Antitrust Agency which scrutinizes the merger proposal (or the
licensing agreement) and only approves welfare-improving operations.11
We show that the consideration of mergers (or licensing agreements) uncovers three new eﬀects of
exclusive dealing. First, exclusive dealings help the incumbent in its bargaining over the terms of the
acquisition. Under exclusivity, if the negotiation collapsed, independent entry would not be possible
and the incumbent would receive its monopoly proﬁts. Instead, absent exclusivity, if the negotiation
collapsed, independent entry would occur and the incumbent would receive zero proﬁt. Therefore,
the incumbent’s disagreement payoﬀ is larger under exclusive dealing and it extracts a larger total
payoﬀ from the negotiation. In a sense, exclusive dealing facilitates the extraction of rents from the
more eﬃcient entrant, similarly to what happens in Aghion and Bolton (1987) where, however, rents
are extracted through liquidated damages, i.e. penalties established in the exclusive contract to be
paid in case of breach.
Albeit the mechanism is completely diﬀerent, this result echoes the discussion of predation when
mergers are possible. In reply to McGee (1958)’s well-known critique that it would be more proﬁtable
for the incumbent to take over the rival rather than preying upon it, Telser (1966) and Yamey (1972)
argued that predation and merger might well be complementary strategies: by engaging in predatory
behavior, the incumbent might induce an entrant to sell its assets at a lower price, an argument later
formalized by Saloner (1987) and Persson (2004).
Second, contrary to the "Chicago School" critique, when mergers (or licensing agreements) are
possible, the incumbent can proﬁtably induce the buyer to accept exclusivity. In the standard "Chicago
School" model mergers are not allowed. Then, signing the contract altogether deters entry, while
independent entry occurs if the contract is rejected. It follows that the incumbent should compensate
the buyer for paying the monopoly price instead of the incumbent’s marginal cost (which is the
price prevailing under independent entry), in order to elicit his acceptance. Due to the monopoly
deadweight loss, the incumbent’s gain from entry deterrence (the monopoly proﬁts) is insuﬃcient to
proﬁtably oﬀer this compensation and the exclusive deal will not be signed in equilibrium. Allowing
for mergers in the "Chicago school" setting makes it proﬁtable to elicit the buyer’s acceptance for
two reasons. First, there are cases (depending on the entrant’s marginal cost) where the merger will
occur irrespective of whether the exclusive dealing has been signed: here, the buyer would require
no compensation to sign exclusivity. Second, there are cases where the merger will occur only when
exclusivity has been signed (independent entry occurring otherwise). In this case, inducing the buyer
to sign exclusivity is facilitated by the fact that the merger makes the incumbent more eﬃcient: on
the one hand, the buyer will pay a lower price than if he had to buy from the less eﬃcient monopolist;
on the other hand, the incumbent will extract part of the merger surplus. Relative to the standard
11This is precisely what happens in the US and in Europe. Note that antitrust agencies monitor not only mergers,
but also horizontal agreements (i.e., agreements between competing ﬁrms), such as licensing agreements.
4"Chicago-school" type model without mergers, the buyer will demand a lower compensation to sign
exclusivity, and the incumbent will have higher gains from it.
Third, we show that — despite the possibility of a merger (or licensing agreement), which indeed
allows the more eﬃcient technology to ﬁnd its way into the industry and makes ineﬃciencies in
production less of a concern — exclusive dealing is still welfare-reducing.12 This occurs for three
reasons. First, there are cases (depending again on the entrant’s marginal cost) where exclusive
deals trigger an ineﬃcient entry mode: in equilibrium, entry occurs through a merger rather than by
independent entry, which entails an allocative ineﬃciency since the merger removes competition and
increases the market price. The intuition for this result is that the Antitrust Authority cannot but
authorize the merger in the presence of exclusive deals, while it blocks the merger and implements
independent entry when no exclusive contract has been signed. The reason being that in the former
case the merger replaces an ineﬃcient monopoly with a more eﬃcient one (which is welfare beneﬁcial),
while in the latter case the merger replaces independent entry with a monopoly (which is welfare
detrimental). Second, when the exclusive contract includes a price commitment, exclusive dealing
leads to a sub-optimal choice of the contractual price. Finally, there are also cases where exclusive
dealing altogether deters entry. This eﬀect can arise in the case of uncertainty, where the incumbent
and the buyer decide on exclusivity before knowing the actual cost of the entrant. In this case, the
buyer might end up accepting ex ante an exclusive contract with a compensation that turns out
to be too small ex post (that is, after the technology of the entrant is revealed). Eﬃcient entry is
deterred by “a mistake” of the buyer who asks too small a compensation, much in a similar way as
in Aghion and Bolton (1987) where entry is deterred by “a mistake” of the incumbent which sets
too large a penalty on breach of contract.
Our results lead to the following policy implications. First, the intensity of upstream competition
matters when analyzing exclusive dealing. The fact that upstream ﬁrms can merge, thereby removing
competition, enables the incumbent to elicit the buyer’s acceptance, which harms welfare. In a
similar vein, Farrell (2005) shows that when upstream sellers compete in quantities rather than in
prices (as assumed in the Chicago school argument) the incumbent can induce to buyer to sign the
exclusive contract, thereby deterring entry. The intuition is that if the buyer expects that, absent
exclusivity, the entrant and the incumbent will not be ﬁerce competitors, then he will request a small
compensation for accepting the exclusive contract. Hence, weak upstream competition facilitates
anti-competitive exclusive dealing.
Second, antitrust authorities should be aware that the welfare detrimental eﬀect of exclusive deal-
ing does not stem only from foreclosure. Indeed our analysis shows that exclusive dealing can harm
welfare also through their impact on merger (or licensing) decisions. Hence, antitrust authorities
should take into account that the policy concerning exclusive contracts and the policy concerning
horizontal mergers (licensing agreements) are related. Diﬀerently stated, exclusive contracts and
12Naturally, this result should not be read as an implication that exclusive dealing should be banned: by construction
our model does not take into account possible pro-competitive eﬀects of exclusive contracts, which may be importanti
in the real world.
5horizontal mergers (licensing agreements) should not be evaluated in isolation, but when assessing
the anti-competitive eﬀects of exclusive dealing, antitrust authorities should anticipate the eﬀect that
it may exert on the subsequent merger (or licensing) decisions.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes the basic model and our main
results. Section 3 discusses a number of extensions to the basic model. Section 4 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider an incumbent ﬁrm (denoted as ﬁrm I) which supplies a good to a single buyer, incurring
a constant marginal cost cI.13 The buyer’s demand is given by q = q(p).
The incumbent faces a threat of entry by a more eﬃcient ﬁrm E,whose marginal cost of producing
the same homogenous good is cE <c I. The entrant can choose between two modes of entry. (1)
It can set up an independent ﬁrm paying a ﬁxed sunk cost f>0. If independent entry occurs, the
entrant and the incumbent compete à la Bertrand. To highlight the potential anti-competitive eﬀects
of an exclusive deal contract, we assume that independent entry is proﬁtable:
(cI − cE)q(cI) − f>0, (A1)
which requires that the entrant is suﬃciently more eﬃcient than the incumbent, i.e. cE <c d
E(f)
where cd
E <c I is the cE ensuring that A1 holds as equality. (2) Alternatively, the entrant can
merge with the incumbent. In this case, the ﬁrm resulting from the merger will adopt the entrant’s
more advanced technology. For simplicity, it is here assumed that adapting the existing plant to
the entrant’s technology is costless. (Section 3.2 will discuss the case of costly technology adoption.)
Further, to highlight the possible anti-competitive eﬀects of the merger, we assume that the eﬃciency
gap between the entrant and the incumbent is not drastic:
pm(cE) ≥ cI (A2)
where pm(c) denotes the monopoly price charged by a ﬁrm with marginal cost c.
Firms planning to merge must notify the project to an Antitrust Agency (denoted as AA), which
decides whether to authorize or block the merger. The AA’s decision is taken in order to maximize
total surplus, measured by the sum of consumer and producer surplus. (Section 3.3 will discuss the
case where the AA’s objective function is consumer surplus.)
In case of a merger, the incumbent and the entrant negotiate over the distribution of the realized
surplus. We do not adopt any speciﬁc bargaining protocol. We simply assume that the involved
parties agree on the merger if each player receives at least its disagreement payoﬀ.As h a r eβ ∈ [0,1]
of the realized net surplus is appropriated by the incumbent (1−β by the entrant). For instance, if
13Considering a single buyer is not a limitation of the analysis. Indeed, when the merger option is not taken into
account, assuming multiple buyers rather than a single one is crucial for the anti-competitive eﬀect to arise. Indeed
the main insight of the literature mentioned in the Introduction is that the incumbent can proﬁtably deter entry by
exploiting the externality that a buyer exerts on the others by signing the exclusive contract. Instead, when mergers
are possible, the anticompetitive eﬀect of exclusive dealings arises also with a single buyer. Considering multiple
buyers would only reinforce our results.
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the entrant can make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the incumbent, then β =0 . If the two ﬁrms share
the gain from trade equally, then β =1 /2.
Prior to the entry decision, the incumbent oﬀers the buyer an exclusive dealing contract. At the
time of contracting, the ﬁrms’ costs are common knowledge. (Section 3.1 will deal with the case
where there exists uncertainty about the entrant’s marginal cost.) The exclusive contract speciﬁes a
compensation x that the incumbent commits to pay to the buyer if he signs the deal, but in the base
model it does not include any commitment to prices. (We will analyze the case of price commitment
in Section 3.4.) Moreover, we assume that the exclusivity provision cannot be breached.14
The timing of the game is as follows (see also Figure 1):
1. At date 1, the incumbent oﬀers the buyer an exclusive dealing contract. The buyer decides
whether to sign the contract.
2. At date 2, the entry decision is taken.
3. At date 3, active ﬁrms simultaneously name prices.
Finally, in order to simplify the analysis, we impose the following restrictions. We ﬁxt h ei n c u m -
bent’s marginal cost to be cI =1 /2, we adopt a linear demand function q(p)=1−p,a n dw ei m p o s e
and upper bound on ﬁxed entry costs. Speciﬁcally we require f to be lower than the monopoly
deadweight loss:
f ≤ CS(cI) − CS(pm(cI)) − πm(cI) (A3)
where CS(p) denotes the surplus enjoyed by the buyer if paying the price p and πm(c) the monopoly
proﬁts of a ﬁrm having marginal cost c. Note that with linear demand and cI =1 /2, assumption A2
14The assumption that the exclusive contract cannot be breached is adopted by most of the literature on anti-
competitive exclusive dealing. Transaction and legal costs for the buyer, or the fact that renegotiating the deal would
involve lengthy and uncertain court decisions (which might imply that the buyer will be left without consuming the
good until the court’s judgment has been made) may explain why breaching the contract is not possible. The existence
of asymmetric information concerning the entrant represents an additional reason why costly renegotiation may not
occur.
7is satisﬁed for any 0 ≤ cE ≤ 1/2.15
We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria and we solve the game backwards.
Product market interaction (date 3) If no entry occurred at date 2, the incumbent charges
the monopoly price pm(cI).
If independent entry occurred, date-3 prices depend on whether the buyer accepted exclusivity.
If the buyer agreed to purchase only from the incumbent, the entrant cannot sell the good and the
buyer pays the monopoly price pm(cI). Instead, if the buyer did not sign the exclusive contract,
competition between the entrant and the incumbent takes place. By assumption A2 in equilibrium
t h em o r ee ﬃcient entrant sells the good charging the price cI (we get rid of equilibria supported by
weakly dominated strategies).
Finally, if entry by merger occurs, the new ﬁrm monopolizes the market and supplies the buyer
charging the monopoly price pm(cE), irrespective of whether the buyer signed the exclusive con-
tract. In other words, exclusive contracts represent an asset in the incumbent’s portfolio, which is
appropriated in case of a merger.
Let us analyze the entrant’s decision at date 2, starting from the decision of the AA about a
proposed merger project.
2.1 Entry decision (date 2)
At date 2, the entrant decides among the merger, independent entry and staying out of the market.
In making this choice, it anticipates the decision of the AA about the merger project.
2.1.1 Decision of the Antitrust Authority.
The decision of the AA depends on the market outcome arising if the merger is blocked, which in
turn crucially depends on whether the exclusive contract has been signed.
(i) Exclusivity has been accepted. In this case, independent entry is unproﬁtable since the
unique buyer is constrained to purchase from the incumbent and entry costs would remain un-
covered (πE = −f<0). This implies that, should the merger be prohibited, the entrant would
remain out of the market, and the incumbent’s monopoly would persist. Instead, if the merger is
allowed, the entrant’s more advanced technology is adopted and a more eﬃcient monopolist replaces
the existing one, thereby increasing both industry proﬁts (πm(cE) >π m(cI)) and consumer surplus
(pm(cE) <p m(cI)). Therefore, under exclusivity the merger is always allowed:
πm(cE)+CS(pm(cE)) >π m(cI)+CS(pm(cI)) for any cE <c d
E.
15These restrictions do not sacrify generality. The speciﬁc value of cI allows to economize with the parameters of
the model. Linear demand simpliﬁes the algebra and facilitates the comparison between the compensation required
by the buyer to agree on exclusivity and the highest oﬀer that the incumbent is willing to make. The upper bound
on entry costs simply limits the diﬀerent cases that we must analyze (see footnote 16 for a clariﬁcation on this issue).
In Fumagalli, Motta and Persson (2006), Appendix A, we discuss at length that the threshold levels of the entrant’s
marginal cost that characterize the entry pattern require very mild assumptions on the demand function to exist.
Hence the eﬀects of exclusive deals that we identify are quite robust.
8(ii) Exclusivity has been rejected. In this case independent entry is proﬁtable. The buyer is not
constrained by any exclusivity obligation and competition between the incumbent and the entrant
takes place if the latter establishes an independent plant. Moreover, assumption A1 ensures that the
buyer’s demand suﬃces to cover the entry costs. Hence, if the merger is prohibited independent entry
occurs. This implies that, in evaluating the merger project, the AA must trade oﬀ the cost in terms
of increased market power (the merger removes competition between the entrant and the incumbent
and the new ﬁrm charges the monopoly price pm(cE) ≥ cI)w i t ht h eb e n e ﬁti nt e r m so fﬁxed costs
saving (the merger involves no ﬁxed costs). The latter dominates if the entrant is suﬃciently eﬃcient,
because this limits the price increase caused by the merger. Formally, the merger is allowed if (and
only if):
πm (cE)+CS(pm (cE)) > (cI − cE)q(cI)+CS(cI) − f. (1)
Condition (1) is satisﬁed if (and only if) cE <c r
E (f) ≡ 1/3 − 1/3
√






for any f, and it is identiﬁed by the cE ensuring that (1) holds as equality.16
2.1.2 Decision of the entrant
We can now move backwards and study the entrant’s decision.
It turns out that the entrant and the incumbent are always willing to merge - irrespective of
exclusivity - because the merger increases industry surplus. Under exclusivity, the merger replaces
an ineﬃcient monopolist with a more eﬃcient one; absent exclusivity, the merger removes competition
and entails a saving in ﬁxed costs. Hence, the merger occurs whenever the AA approves the proposal.
Section 2.1.1 has shown that under exclusivity t h eA Aa l w a y se n d o r s e st h em e r g e rp r o p o s a l .
Hence, entry by merger always occurs. Each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is given by its disagreement point payoﬀ
plus its share of the net realized surplus:
πs
I = πm(cI)+β [πm(cE) − πm(cI)] (2)
πs
E =( 1 − β)[πm(cE) − πm(cI)] ≥ 0 (3)
with β ∈ [0,1]. Note that the incumbent’s disagreement payoﬀ amounts to the monopoly proﬁts,
since the entrant would stay out of the market if the negotiation should break down.
By contrast, absent exclusivity the AA approves the merger if (and only if) the entrant is suﬃ-
ciently eﬃcient (cE <c r
E). When this is the case, ﬁrms’ payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb y :
π
r,m
I = β [πm(cE) − ((cI − cE)q(cI) − f)] ≥ 0 (4)
π
r,m
E = β [(cI − cE)q(cI) − f]+( 1− β)πm(cE) > 0. (5)
Note that the incumbent’s disagreement payoﬀ now amounts to zero, since independent entry would
occur if the negotiation should fail.
16Condition (1) should clarify the reason why we impose an upper bound on f. Larger values of f would imply that
either the ﬁxed costs saving is so relevant that the merger is always allowed, or that the equation identiﬁed by (1)
a d m i t st w os o l u t i o n s ,t h e r e b yl e a d i n gt oa nadditional interval over which the merger is allowed. These cases do not
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Figure 2: The entry pattern, the equilibrium choice and the welfare eﬀects.
When instead the eﬃciency gap between the entrant and the incumbent is not large enough
(cE ≥ cr
E), the merger is blocked and independent entry occurs. The incumbent’s payoﬀ is 0 while
the entrant earns π
r,i
E =( cI − cE)q(cI) − f>0.
The entry pattern is summarized by Lemma 1 and by Figure 2.
Lemma 1 : At date 2, the entrant takes the following decision:






• If the buyer rejected the exclusive deal, the entrant merges with the incumbent if cE ∈ [0,c r
E).
Otherwise, the merger is blocked and independent entry occurs.
Lemma 1 highlights that exclusive deals aﬀect the entry pattern by triggering the merger instead
of independent entry (when cE ∈ (cr
E,c d
E). The reason is that the AA is more lenient towards
the merger in the presence of the exclusive agreement, since the alternative to the merger is the
persistence of the former (ineﬃcient) monopolist, whereas in the absence of exclusivity the alternative
to the merger is independent entry, which is more desirable for society.
2.2 Contracting decision (date 1)
We now study whether the buyer and the incumbent agree on exclusivity. We will compare the
minimum compensation that the buyer requires to accept exclusivity, i.e. the one that makes him
indiﬀerent between signing and rejecting the contract, with the incumbent’s gain from having the
contract signed. The exclusive deal will be signed in equilibrium if the latter is larger. To do this, it
proves helpful to distinguish the following two cases.
10Case 1: Large eﬃciency gap between the entrant and the incumbent (cE <c r
E).
In this case the exclusive contract is always signed in equilibrium. The reason is that the merger
occurs irrespective of exclusivity. Hence the buyer anticipates that he will end up paying the price
pm(cE) irrespective of his decision and is willing to sign the contract behind any (weakly) positive
compensation x ≥ 0. In turn the incumbent is willing to oﬀer a strictly positive compensation to
have the contract signed: by making independent entry unproﬁtable, having the contract signed
increases its disagreement payoﬀ and allows it to extract a larger total payoﬀ from the negotiation
for the merger. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (6), which shows the maximum




I =[ πm(cI) − 0] + β [(cI − cE)q(cI) − f − πm(cI)] (6)
=( 1 − β)πm(cI)+β ((cI − cE)q(cI) − f) > 0. (7)
This analysis, by showing that exclusive deals make the incumbent a "tougher bargainer" in the
subsequent merger negotiation, uncovers a new reason why exclusive deals beneﬁt the incumbent.
In a sense, the exclusive contract represents a coalition between the incumbent and the buyer at the
expense of the entrant.17 This role is similar to that played by exclusive deals when the exclusivity
provision can be breached by paying stipulated damages.18 In that case, the incumbent has an
incentive to set the damages in such a way that (independent) entry is accommodated and that it
a p p r o p r i a t e st h ee n t i r es u r p l u st h em o r ee ﬃcient producer brings to the market.
This result echoes the discussion of predation when mergers are possible. In reply to McGee
(1958)’s well-known critique that it would be more proﬁtable for the incumbent to take over the rival
rather than preying upon it, Telser (1966) and Yamey (1972) argued that predation and merger might
well be complementary strategies: by engaging in predatory behavior, the incumbent might induce
an entrant to sell its assets at a lower price, an argument later formalized by Saloner (1987) and
Persson (2004). Similarly to these papers — although obviously with completely diﬀerent mechanisms
—w ea l s oﬁnd that exclusive dealing will help the incumbent in its bargaining over the terms of the
acquisition.
Case 2: Small eﬃciency gap between the entrant and the incumbent (cE ≥ cr
E).
In this case, the AA approves the merger only in the presence of the exclusivity provision. Hence the
buyer anticipates that he will be better oﬀ if he rejects the contract, because his rejection will cause
independent entry instead of the merger and he will have pay the price cI instead of pm(cE) ≥ cI.
The minimum compensation that the buyer requires to accept exclusivity is then strictly positive
and amounts to surplus lost paying a larger price:
xB = CS(cI) − CS(pm(cE)) > 0.
By contrast the exclusive deal, by triggering the merger instead of independent entry, strictly
beneﬁts the incumbent. Under independent entry it should compete with the more eﬃcient entrant
17The entrant’s payoﬀ would be higher if the exclusive deal were rejected: π
r,m
E − πs
E = β [(cI − cE)q(cI) − f]+
(1 − β)πm(cI) > 0.
18See Aghion and Bolton (1987) and Spier and Whinston (1995).
11and its payoﬀ would be 0, whereas when the merger occurs it obtains part of the proﬁts generated
by the new ﬁrm. Hence, the maximum compensation that the incumbent is willing to oﬀer is given
by:
xI = πs
I − 0=πm(cI)+β [πm(cE) − πm(cI)] > 0.
Is the incumbent’s beneﬁt from having the contract signed large enough to proﬁtably compensate
the buyer? The following Lemma shows that this is the case if (and only if) the cost diﬀerence between
the entrant and the incumbent is large enough.
Lemma 2 Proﬁtability of eliciting the buyer’s acceptance.







such that xI >x B if (and only if) cE <c ∗
E(β).
(ii) The threshold c∗
E(β) is strictly increasing in β.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for this result is that the lower cE the lower the monopoly price charged by the
merger entity and thus the lower the loss suﬀered by the buyer when he signs the contract (i.e. xB
is decreasing in cE). On top of this, the lower cE the higher the proﬁts generated by the merged
entity and the higher the value of the merger. This makes the incumbent’s beneﬁt from having the
contract signed larger (i.e. xI is increasing in cE) since it captures a share β of the surplus created
by the merger. It follows that, when cE is suﬃciently low, it is proﬁtable for the incumbent to elicit
the buyer’s acceptance.
Moreover, note that the larger β, i.e. the larger the incumbent’s share of the net realized surplus,
the larger the incumbent’s maximum compensation xI. Hence, the more likely that the exclusive
contract is signed in equilibrium.
Summing up the analysis, we can state the following result, which is also illustrated by Figure 2.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the game exhibits the following features:
• When cE ∈ [0,c ∗
E(β)), the exclusive contract is signed and ﬁrm E enters by merging with the
incumbent.
• When cE ∈ [c∗
E(β),c d
E), the exclusive contract is rejected and ﬁrm E enters by establishing an
independent plant.
There are two issues that are worth discussing. The ﬁrst one is the role of mergers in making
the exclusive deal signed. More precisely, in a setting where the possibility of mergers is not taken
into account (as in the standard Chicago School setting), the exclusive contract is never signed in
equilibrium. In that case having the contract signed altogether deters entry, while independent entry
occurs if the contract is rejected. Hence, the incumbent should compensate the buyer for the loss
suﬀered paying the monopoly price pm(cI) i n s t e a do ft h ep r i c ecI prevailing under (independent)
entry. Due to the monopoly deadweight loss, the incumbent’s gain from entry deterrence (the
12monopoly proﬁts) is strictly lower than the buyer’s loss so that the incumbent cannot proﬁtably
elicit acceptance.
Instead, when mergers are allowed for, there exist situations where the exclusive deal is signed.
This occurs for two reasons. First, the fact that mergers are an entry option decreases the minimum
compensation that the buyer requires to agree upon exclusivity. As the analysis above has shown,
either the buyer anticipates that the merger occurs irrespective of his decision so that he will not
suﬀer any loss when signing (i.e. xB =0 ); or the buyer anticipates that signing triggers the merger
instead of independent entry. In this case, the buyer will still pay the monopoly price instead of the
competitive price cI, but the technology transfer creates a more eﬃcient incumbent and the buyer
will pay a lower monopoly price. In other words, the buyer must be compensated for the loss caused
by the price increase pm (cE)−cI, which is lower than the price increase pm (cI) −cI suﬀered when
mergers are not a feasible option. Second, the fact that mergers are an entry option increases the
incumbent’s beneﬁt from the contract being signed. The reason is that, when the merger occurs, the
incumbent extracts part of the net surplus realized. This reinforces the previous eﬀect.
The second issue concerns the welfare eﬀects of exclusive deals. In particular, exclusive deals are
welfare neutral when the merger occurs irrespective of whether the exclusive deal contract is signed
(i.e. when cE <c r
E). The buyer is equally well oﬀ in either case, and exclusive deals only aﬀect
the distribution of total welfare, making it more favorable for the incumbent. Instead, exclusive
deals are welfare detrimental when they trigger the merger instead of independent entry (i.e. when
cE ∈ (cr
E,c ∗
E)). This follows from the fact that absent exclusivity, the AA would block the merger
and would implement independent entry. Instead, in the presence of the exclusive deal contract the
AA cannot but approve the merger, even though total welfare would be higher under independent
entry. Consequently, we can state the following result:
Proposition 2 Banning exclusive deals would be (weakly) welfare beneﬁcial.
Note that the detrimental eﬀect does not stem from the fact that exclusive deals foreclose entry
and prevent the adoption of the more advanced technology, but from the fact that, by distorting the
AA’s decision, they trigger an ineﬃcient entry mode.
This result highlights that anti-trust authorities should be aware of the important link between the
policy concerning exclusive deals and the policy concerning mergers. Diﬀerently stated, exclusive
deals and mergers should not be evaluated in isolation, but when assessing the anti-competitive
eﬀects of exclusive deals, antitrust authorities should not only focus on their foreclosure potential,
but should anticipate the eﬀect that exclusive deals may exert on merger decisions.
One might wonder whether allowing for merger remedies (i.e. approving the merger subject to
conditions) can help removing the ineﬃciency in the AA’s decision. However, in the presence of
the exclusive deal contract, approving the merger provided that exclusivity is breached does not
implement independent entry. The only way to induce independent entry is to block the merger and
dissolve exclusivity. This would not represent a merger remedy, but would be equivalent to banning
exclusive deals.
13Similarly, imagine that at the beginning of the game the AA announces that it will allow mergers
involving exclusive deals only if exclusivity is breached. This announcement will aﬀect the contracting
stage by reducing the incumbent’s gain from having the contract signed. In particular, it is still the
case that having the contract signed will trigger the merger instead of independent entry, but it will
not improve the incumbent’s position in the merger negotiation. Eliciting acceptance would result
unproﬁtable. Likewise, the incumbent could not proﬁtably induce the buyer to sign if the AA could
credibly commit to block mergers that would be anti-competitive in the absence of exclusive deals.
However, all these policies are equivalent to a ban on exclusive deals.
3E x t e n s i o n s
In this Section we discuss a number of extensions to the model of Section 2.
3.1 Uncertainty about the entrant’s marginal cost.
Section 2 assumes that when the incumbent and the buyer take their decisions on exclusivity, they
can perfectly anticipate how eﬃcient the entrant will be. This assumption may be questionable and
it may seem more realistic to assume that, at the contracting stage, only the distribution function of
the entrant’s marginal cost is common knowledge. Appendix B solves a variant of the model where
we assume that the entrant’s marginal cost is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1]. Most
of the results obtained in the deterministic setting of Section 2 hold good. The only diﬀerence is
that with uncertainty the exclusive deal contract is always signed in equilibrium as the following
Proposition states:
Proposition 3 When there exists uncertainty about the entrant’s marginal cost the buyer always
signs the exclusive deal.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The reason is that under uncertainty, the buyer computes how much to demand as compensation
by averaging over the entire range of possible realizations of the entrant’s marginal costs. By so
doing, he takes into account that there also exist cases where the merger occurs irrespective of his
decision so that his loss from accepting exclusivity is zero. This reduces the average compensation
that the buyer requires and makes it proﬁtable for the incumbent to always elicit acceptance.
Similarly to the deterministic case, for some realizations of the entrant’s marginal costs the fact
that the exclusive deal is signed is irrelevant for the entry pattern, but for other realizations it will
induce the AA to approve the merger even though independent entry would be socially optimal. It
follows that, from an ex-ante perspective, total welfare would be higher if exclusive dealings were
prohibited.
Proposition 4 Banning exclusive deals would increase total expected welfare.
Proof. See Appendix B.
143.2 Costly mergers.
Section 2 assumes that mergers are costless. Let us consider now the case where adapting the
incumbent’s plant to the entrant’s more advanced technology entails a ﬁxed cost.
If such a cost is suﬃciently low, no additional result is obtained with respect to the model of
Section 2. Instead, new insights arise if the technology transfer is suﬃciently costly. In particular, it
turns out that exclusive deals may deter entry altogether. The intuition is that, under exclusivity, the
entrant and the incumbent are not necessarily willing to merge. If their cost diﬀerence is low enough,
the (small) increase of monopoly proﬁts produced by the merger is insuﬃcient to dominate the (large)
cost associated with the technology transfer and industry surplus would decrease.19 Hence, under
exclusivity the entrant stays out of the market. Instead, in the absence of exclusivity ﬁrms would
like to merge, but the AA blocks the project and independent entry occurs.
However, if the entrant’s marginal cost is common knowledge at the contracting stage, the in-
cumbent would not be able to elicit the buyer’s acceptance. The buyer would anticipate that his
decision to sign deters entry, while independent entry occurs if he rejects. In order to sign he would
require a compensation that the incumbent could not proﬁtably oﬀer (in other words, the Chicago
school argument applies).
By contrast, the exclusive deal is signed in equilibrium if there exists uncertainty about the
entrant’s marginal cost. Again, uncertainty makes the buyer take into account also the realizations
of the entrant’s marginal cost where his loss from accepting exclusivity amounts to zero (because
the merger occurs irrespective of his decision) and the ones where his decision to sign triggers the
merger instead of independent entry, in which case the loss that he suﬀers from exclusivity is lower
with respect to the case where his decision to sign leads to foreclosure. This reduces the average
compensation required by the buyer and makes it proﬁtable for the incumbent to elicit acceptance.
Note that ex-post, when the entrant’s technology realizes, the compensation received may turn
out to be smaller than the loss actually suﬀered. Hence, eﬃcient entry ends up being deterred
(or the entry mode ends up being ineﬃcient) by "a mistake" of the buyer who asks too small a
compensation, in a similar vein as in Aghion and Bolton (1987) where entry is deterred by "a
mistake" of the incumbent, which sets too large a contractual penalty for breach of contract.20
19Fumagalli, Motta, Persson (2006) fully develops the case of costly mergers and identiﬁes the exact threshold levels
of the merger cost and of the entrant’s marginal cost mentioned in this discussion.
20Note also that in the standard setting where mergers are not feasible, there is no scope for entry deterrence by
mistake. The incumbent and the buyer anticipate that only two situations may arise. Either the realization of the
entrant’s marginal cost will make independent entry proﬁtable (i.e. cE <c d
E): in this case, exclusive deals altogether
deter entry; or the realization of the entrant’s marginal cost will make independent entry unproﬁtable (i.e. cE ≥ cd
E).
In this case, exclusive deals have no impact on the entry pattern: the incumbent’s monopoly persists in either case.
Hence, the incumbent beneﬁts from having the contract signed (and the buyer suﬀers a loss) only in the former case. In
expected terms, the maximum compensation that it is willing to oﬀer amounts to x0
I = πm(cI)cd
E, while the minimun
compensation required by the buyer amounts to x0
B =[ CS(cI) − CS(pm(cI))]cd
E. Due to the monopoly deadweight
loss, the latter is larger.
153.3 Consumer surplus as the AA’s standard.
There has been a long debate among economists on whether the objective of competition policy
should be to maximize the total surplus or rather the consumer surplus, and whether, in practice,
Antitrust Agencies and the Courts pursue one objective or the other.21 Therefore, it is important
to note that our results do not change if we assume that the AA evaluates mergers on the grounds
of consumer surplus only.
Under exclusivity the AA would always approve the merger also if it adopted a consumer surplus
standard, since the merger creates a more eﬃcient monopolist and the buyer ends up paying a lower
price. Hence entry by merger would occur.
Instead, absent exclusivity the AA would always block the merger, as it cares about the increase
of market power only and does not take into account that the merger entails a ﬁxed cost saving. In
this case independent entry would occur.
Thus, the diﬀerence with respect to Section 2 is that the case where the merger occurs irrespective
of the exclusive deal (and the buyer signs behind a zero compensation) does not arise. But the result
stated in Lemma 2 still applies, and the exclusive deal is signed in equilibrium if (and only if) the
entrant is suﬃciently eﬃcient (i.e. if cE <c ∗
E(β)).
3.4 Price commitment.
In this Section we study the eﬀect of exclusive deals when the contract commits the incumbent not
only to oﬀer the compensation x but also to sell the good at a given price p.
The remaining assumptions are the same as in Section 2, except for the fact that when exclusivity
has been rejected, we allow the entrant and the incumbent to use two-part tariﬀs. The reason is the
following. Since the contract commits both to a unit price and a ﬁxed payment, under exclusivity
the incumbent is essentially using a two-part tariﬀ, which is an instrument to eliminate ineﬃciencies.
If we did not give the same possibility to upstream ﬁrms when exclusivity is absent, we would create
a bias in favour of exclusive deals, which would turn out being welfare beneﬁcial. However this result
would be driven only by the asymmetry between the pricing strategies available to ﬁrms.22
Under two-part tariﬀs, the assumption that independent entry is proﬁtable translates into
CS(cE) − CS(cI) >f . (A1’)
We solve the game backwards starting from the pricing decisions at date 3.
P r o d u c tm a r k e ti n t e r a c t i o n( d a t e3 ) If the exclusive deal has been signed, the buyer pays the
contractual price p irrespective of the entry decision at date 2. In other words, in case of merger,
the new ﬁrm inherits the contractual obligations undertaken by the incumbent.
21See Motta (2004: 19-22) for a discussion. See also Fridolfsson (2007), Neven and Roeller (2005) and Lyons (2002)
for recent papers which provide a theoretical underpinning to a consumer surplus standard.
22In the previous draft of the paper (Fumagalli, Motta and Persson 2006), where we allowed only for linear tariﬀs
absent exclusivity, we obtained precisely this result. We are grateful to Pierre Regibeau for bringing this point to our
attention.
16Instead, if the exclusive deal has been rejected, date-3 prices are aﬀected by the entry decision.
If independent entry occurred at date 2, the incumbent and the entrant compete for the buyer.
The incumbent’s best oﬀer is pI = cI and FI =0 . The entrant, being more eﬃcient, can beat
this oﬀer by ﬁxing the unit price equal to its (lower) marginal cost and setting the ﬁxed fee in
such a way that the buyer is indiﬀerent between the incumbent’s oﬀer and the entrant’s: pE = cE,
FE = CS(cE)−CS(cI).23 Hence, under independent entry, the buyer enjoys a payoﬀ equal to CS(cI).
If the merger occurred at date 2, no competition takes place. The merged entity, having adopted
the more advanced technology, sets also in this case a unit price equal to cE. However, it extracts
the entire consumer surplus through the ﬁxed fee (p = cE,F= CS(cE)), leaving the buyer with a
payoﬀ equal to 0.
Entry decision (date 2) At date 2 entry by merger occurs both if the exclusive deal has been
signed and if it has been rejected. In both cases the merger increases industry surplus and the AA
approves the project.
Absent exclusivity, the merger increases industry proﬁts because it removes competition (no
surplus is left to the buyer) and avoids sinking the set-up cost:
CS(cE) >C S (cE) − CS(cI) − f.
Note that, due to the possibility of adopting non-linear tariﬀs, the merger does not entail allocative
ineﬃciencies: both in the case of the merger and of independent entry the ﬁrst-best unit price is set.
Hence, the dampening of competition caused by the merger aﬀects the distribution of total surplus
but not its total amount. Since the merger produces also a ﬁxed costs saving, it increases total
s u r p l u sa n dt h eA Aa p p r o v e st h ep r o j e c t . 24 The incumbent’s and the buyer’s payoﬀ are as follows:
πr
I = β [CS(cI)+f]
πr
B =0
When exclusivity has been accepted, the merger increases industry surplus because the contrac-
tual quantity is produced more eﬃciently. More precisely, should the merger fail, the entrant would
stay out of the market, the incumbent would produce the good and it would charge the contractual
price p. In case of merger, the price must be the same, but the adoption of the more advanced
technology reduces production costs:
q(p)(p − cI) >q (p)(p − cE).
Since the buyer pays the contractual price p irrespective of the entry decision, also total surplus is
larger when the merger occurs and the AA approves the project. The incumbent’s and the buyer’s
23To avoid confusion with the notation note that, absent exclusivity, the ﬁxed component F of the two-part tariﬀ -
when positive - represents a payment from the buyer to the upstream ﬁrm. By contrast, under exclusivity, the ﬁxed
component x - when positive - represents a payment from the incumbent to the buyer.
24Of course, the decision of the AA might be diﬀerent if it cared about the distribution of total surplus. For instance,
the AA would block the merger if it cared about consumer surplus only.
17payoﬀ are as follows:
πs
I =( p − cI)q(p)+β [(cI − cE)q(p)] − x
πs
B = CS(p)+x.
Contractual decision (date 1) The buyer anticipates that if he accepts exclusivity, he will
pay the contractual price p irrespective of the subsequent entry decision. Instead, if he rejects
the exclusive deal, entry by merger will occur and his entire surplus will be extracted by the new
monopolist. It follows that the buyer is strictly better oﬀ under exclusivity and he is willing to pay
in order to sign a contract committing to the price p. Diﬀerently stated the minimum compensation
that the buyer requires is negative, being a payment which amounts to the surplus that the buyer
enjoys from paying the price p rather than being extracted all the surplus:
xB(p)=−CS(p). (8)
It is now possible to identify the optimal contract that the incumbent can oﬀer in order to induce
acceptance. Proposition 5 illustrates also the equilibrium of the game.
Proposition 5 The optimal contract commits to supply the good at the price p∗ = cI − β(cI − cE)
and to oﬀer the compensation x∗ = −CS(p∗) < 0.
In equilibrium the incumbent oﬀers this contract and the buyer accepts exclusivity.
Proof. By (8), the optimal contract to elicit the buyer’s acceptance solves the following problem:
max
p {[p − (cI − β(cI − cE))]q(p)+CS(p)}. (9)
Recalling that CS(p)=
R ∞
p q(t)dt, the ﬁrst-order condition is:




and p∗ = cI − β(cI − cE).
Hence by oﬀering this contract the incumbent earns π∗s
I = −xB(p∗)=CS(p∗). Appendix C
shows that π∗s
I >π r
I so that it is proﬁtable for the incumbent to induce acceptance.
The intuition for this result is the following. When the contract is signed, the merger occurs
and the incumbent earns its disagreement payoﬀ - i.e. the proﬁts (p − cI)q(p) that it would make
producing and selling itself the good - plus a share of the eﬃciency gains that the entrant brings into
the market, β(cI − cE)q(p). The overall payoﬀ,w h i c hi st h eﬁrst component in expression (9), can
be interpreted as the proﬁts made by a ﬁrm whose marginal cost is cI − β(cI −cE). O nt o po ft h i s ,
the non-linear pricing schedule (price commitment + ﬁxed compensation) allows the incumbent to
extract the buyer’s surplus (second component in expression 9). As a result, the optimal contractual
18price is chosen in order to maximize the sum of the consumer and the producer’s surplus, which
leads to the "corrected" marginal cost pricing p∗ = cI − β(cI − cE).25
Note that, except for the special case where β =1 , the optimal contractual price p∗ is larger than
the ﬁrst-best price cE established by the merged entity absent exclusivity. Hence, unless the incum-
bent extracts the entire surplus generated by the merger, exclusive deals are welfare detrimental.
Proposition 6 Banning exclusive deals would be (weakly) welfare beneﬁcial.
Again, the negative impact on welfare does not stem from foreclosure. Indeed, entry by merger
occurs irrespective of the exclusive agreement. None the less total welfare is lower under exclusivity
because, in that case, it is the incumbent rather than the merged entity that chooses the price. Since
the incumbent appropriates only partially the eﬃciency gains associated with the more advanced
technology, it has inadequate incentives to choose the welfare-maximizing price.
Also in this case, it is worth comparing our results with the benchmark case where mergers are
not an entry option. In that case, if the buyer rejects exclusivity, independent entry occurs and
competition between the entrant and the incumbent takes place. Eventually, the entrant supplies
the buyer who enjoys the surplus CS(cI). Instead, if the exclusive deal is signed, entry does not
occur and the incumbent supplies the good charging the contractual price p. Hence, the minimum
compensation that the buyer requires to accept exclusivity amounts to x0
B = CS(cI) − CS(p) and
the incumbent’s payoﬀ from having the contract signed is given by:
πs
I =( p − cI)q(p)+CS(p) − CS(cI).
It follows that the optimal contract to elicit acceptance exhibits p∗ = cI and x∗ =0 , and that it
is not proﬁtable for the incumbent to oﬀer it (π∗s
I =0=πr
I). In other words, exclusivity does not
beneﬁt the incumbent.
Why allowing for mergers creates the scope for eliciting acceptance in a proﬁtable way? Again,
the main reason is that, when mergers are an entry option, the buyer requires a lower compensation
to agree on exclusivity:
xB = −CS(p) <C S (cI) − CS(p)=x0
B.
Indeed, the buyer is willing to pay in order to sign the exclusive contract because he anticipates
that, if he rejects, the merger will follow, competition will not take place, and his entire surplus will
be extracted. On top of this, the fact that the incumbent appropriates part of the eﬃciency gains
generated by the merger creates the incentive to ﬁx a contractual price below cI, which increases
further the payment that the buyer is willing to oﬀer and enhances the proﬁtability of eliciting
acceptance.
25We would obtain the same results under the assumption that the AA adopts a consumer surplus standard. In
such a case, the merger is always blocked absent exclusivity, and it is always allowed in the presence of exclusivity
(the buyer pays the contractual price irrespective of the entry decision). The compensation required by the buyer
is now CS(c) − CS(p), because the buyer anticipates that his rejection triggers independent entry, but the optimal
contractual price is again p∗. Hence eliciting acceptance makes the incumbent earn πs∗
I = CS(p∗) − CS(cI) > 0 for
any β>0. Since under independent entry the incumbent’s payoﬀ is 0, oﬀering the exclusive contract is proﬁtable.
194C o n c l u s i o n
This paper extends the existing literature on exclusive dealing by not only allowing a more eﬃcient
producer to enter the market by setting up a new venture but also by merging with the incumbent
ﬁrm (or, equivalently, by licensing its more eﬃcient technology to the incumbent).
First, we identify a new rationale for exclusive dealing provisions: they allow the incumbent
to extract a larger surplus in the subsequent merger with the potential entrant. Consequently,
a prediction of this paper is that, ceteris paribus, ﬁrms which lock a considerable proportion of
buyers by using exclusivity provisions would gain more in merger deals (or, under the alternative
interpretation, pay less in technology transfer agreements).
Second, we show that relative to the standard “Chicago-School” type model without mergers,
the buyer will demand a lower compensation to sign exclusivity, and the incumbent will have higher
gains from it. Hence, contrary to the “Chicago School” critique, the incumbent can proﬁtably elicit
the buyer’ acceptance when mergers are possible.
Third, we show that exclusive deals are welfare detrimental — despite the existence of the merger
option, which allows the more eﬃcient technology to ﬁnd its way into the industry. The reason is
the following. When the contract does not include a price commitment, the presence of exclusive
deals may distort the AA’s decision so that in equilibrium the merger will be approved, even though
total welfare would be higher under independent entry. On top of this exclusive deals might in
some circumstances deter entry altogether. When the contract includes a commitment to prices, the
presence of exclusive deals leads to a distortion in the choice of the contractual price.
This paper deals with exclusive contracts, but we suspect that similar eﬀects would arise when
an incumbent ﬁrm takes other actions aimed at making captive consumers, so as to make it more
diﬃcult for them to switch to new entrants. Examples of such actions could be decisions to make
a product/network incompatible with other products/networks; strategies which increase artiﬁcially
switching costs of consumers, and non-compete clauses in managerial contracts.
20A Appendix
The threshold c∗
E(β) is the value of cE that solves the following equation:
πm(cI)+β [πm(cE) − πm(cI)] = CS(cI) − CS(pm(cE)) (10)

















which has the (admissible) solution
cE =1−
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1 − 24f and cd
E(f)=1 /2 − 2f. Moreover, recall that assumption




E(β) is increasing in β
and cr
E(f) is increasing in f, it follows that c∗
E(β) >c r
E(f) for any β ∈ [0,1] and for any f ≤ 1/32.




E(β) is increasing in β and cd
E(f) is
decreasing in f, it follows that c∗
E(β) <c d
E(f) for any β ∈ [0,1] and for any f ≤ 1/32.
B Appendix
This Appendix assumes that at the contracting stage the incumbent and the buyer cannot perfectly
anticipate the entrant’s marginal cost. They just know its distribution function. After they decide on
the exclusive dealing, Nature chooses the realization of the entrant’s marginal cost, which becomes
common knowledge. Then the entry decision and the price decisions are taken. For simplicity, we
assume that the entrant’s marginal cost is uniformly distributed over [0,1].
The entry pattern at date 2 is summarized by Figure 3. When independent entry is proﬁtable,
Lemma 1 applies. When independent entry is not proﬁtable (i.e. cE ≥ cd
E) the alternative to
the merger is "no entry" irrespective of whether the exclusive deal is signed. Hence, the decision






entry by merger occurs both with and without exclusivity; if instead the
e n t r a n ti sl e s se ﬃcient than the incumbent (cE ≥ 1/2), there exists no scope for the merger and no
entry occurs in both cases. For this reason the buyer is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting
the contract (he ends up paying the same price) and the incumbent does not gain from having the
contract signed.







[CS(cI) − CS(pm (cE))]dcE > 0









E {πm(cI)+β [πm(cE) − πm(cI)]}dcE > 0
(11)












































































Figure 3: Entry pattern when the realization of cE belongs to [0,1].
We now show that xI >x B for any β ∈ [0,1] so that it is proﬁtable for the incumbent to have the
contract signed.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .






. It is easy to verify
that




















for any f ≤ 1/32.
We now show that xI is increasing in β. Note that when independent entry is proﬁtable and
the merger occurs anyway (i.e. when cE <c r
E), the value of the merger is diﬀerent depending on
whether the exclusive deal is signed or it is rejected. In particular, if the contract is signed, the
merger creates a more eﬃcient monopoly whereas if the contract is rejected, the merger creates a
m o n o p o l yi n s t e a do fa ne ﬃcient duopolist. The increase in industry surplus can be either smaller or
larger in the latter case, depending on the cost diﬀerence between the incumbent and the entrant and
the cost of entry. However, in this model it turns out that for cE <c r
E the duopolistic market is more
proﬁtable than the ineﬃcient monopoly and the merger creates a larger surplus when the exclusive
deal is signed. Hence, the sign of the squared bracket in the ﬁr s ti n t e g r a lo f( 1 1 )i sp o s i t i v ea n dt h e
incumbent’s beneﬁt from the contract being signed increases with β. The incumbent’s beneﬁtf r o m
the contract being signed is increasing in β also when exclusive deals make the merger occur instead










∂β > 0. Since xB does not depend on β,it must be that xI >x B for any β ∈ [0,1].
L e tu sa n a l y z en o wt h ew e l f a r ee ﬀects. When the exclusive dealing does not change the entry
pattern (i.e. either when cE <c r
E or cE ≥ cd
E), it has no eﬀect on total welfare (recall that when the
22merger occurs irrespective of exclusivity it is the distribution of total welfare which is aﬀected). It is
only when the exclusive dealing triggers the merger instead of independent entry that total welfare
is reduced, since the socially optimal entry mode entails the set up of an independent plant. Hence,
banning exclusive deals would strictly increase total expected welfare, as showed by Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
Forbidding exclusive deals causes the following expected welfare change (where Wi with i = f,a














E [CS(pm(cE)) + πm(cE)]dcE > 0
by the deﬁnition of cr
E.
CA p p e n d i x
This Appendix shows that under price commitment eliciting acceptance is proﬁtable for the incum-
bent, i.e. that
π∗s
I = CS[cI − β(cI − cE)] >β [CS(cI)+f]=πr
I
for any β ∈ [0,1]. By assumption A1’, f<C S (cE) − CS(cI). Hence, a suﬃcient condition for the
above inequality to be satisﬁed is that
CS[cI − β(cI − cE)] ≥ βCS(cE). (12)
When β =0 , condition (12) boils down to
CS(cI) ≥ 0
which is satisﬁed. When β =1 , condition (12) boils down to
CS(cE) ≥ CS(cE)
which is satisﬁed.
With linear demand CS(p)=( 1− p)2/2 and condition (12) can be written as
(1 − β)
£
(1 − cI)2 − β(cI − cE)2¤
≥ 0.
By assumption A2, (1+cE)/2 ≥ cI, which is equivalent to cI −cE < 1−cI. It follows that condition
(12) is satisﬁed also when β ∈ (0,1).
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